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INTRODUCTION
Edward McWhinney*

It is fitting in a collection of essays in honor of Julius Stone,
perhaps the greatest living exponent of the Anglo-Saxon School of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 1 founded by Stone's own great teacher
and mentor, Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, 2 that
we should concentrate upon the judicial process, the creative opportunities for judicial policy-making, and the very real limitations
upon the Court's exercise of a legislative role in the elaboration of
the "new" international law of our own particular era of transition
and rapid change in the World Community. Stone, in his seminal
writings on Philosophy of Law, 3 was among the first to point out
and demonstrate in any systematic, scientific-empirical way, the
limitations of traditional legal logic as applied to the judicial process, and the many ambiguities inherent in the conventional legal
categories4 which open the way for what Cardozo called interstitial judicial legislation. 5 Stone has also, because of his commitment to Sociology of Law, always been keenly aware of the symbiotic relation between Law and Society-between the formalized
norms of statutes, court decisions and other positive law texts, as
written, and the basic societal facts and conditions of the community in respect to which that positive law is to operate. 6 The
societal facts necessarily operate to condition and to limit, and if
not properly taken into account by the official decision-maker, to
frustrate, the positive law prescriptions, as originally written. This
is, of course, one of the basic truths of Sociological Jurisprudence
-the all too frequent gap between the Law-in-Books and the
Law-in-Action. Stone's lesson, here, was to preach the socioethical limitations to effective legal action. 7 This was a counsel of
* Queen's Counsel; Barrister and Solicitor; Professor oflntemational Law and Relations,
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada; Membre de l'Institut de Droit International.
1. As to international law, see Stone, Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries
Concerning International Law, 89 RECUEIL DES CouRs 65 (1956).
2. See, e.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1930); R. POUND,
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).
3. See especially Stone's magnum opus, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS
LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1946) [hereinafter cited as THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION
OF LAW].
4. J. STONE, Fallacies of the Logical Form in Legal Reasoning, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 149 et. seq. (1946).
5. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
6. STONE, Law and Society, THE PROVINCE AND FuNCTION OF LAW 391 et. seq. (1946).
7. Id. at 673 et. seq.; see also Stone, What Price Effectiveness? [1956] PROC. AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 198.
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prudence, directed to judicial decision-makers among others,
about the dangers of trying to jump too far ahead of the society in
which the decision-makers must operate, lest an overly ambitious
or premature venture in community policy-making on the part of
the judges should turn out to be counter-productive and so delay
or even frustrate altogether the cause of fundamental legal
change. 8 Finally, Stone recognized what Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has designated as the "roles and missions" in law and the lawmaking processes9-that at any particular time and in respect to
particular social problems, some agencies of government may be
more suited to community policy-making than other agencies of
government; and that, as a general principle and especially for the
more highly politicized problems, the courts may often be rather
less effective in community problem-solving than the other, more
overtly and avowedly, political organs of government.1°
These three (and other) aspects of Julius Stone's work are
amply developed in the following Festschrift commemorating his
retirement. The majority of the articles are written by collegues and
former students of Stone. They include excellent illustrations of
contemporary European approaches to jurisprudence. This collection of articles, both European and American, thus constitutes a
testimony to the immense influence Julius Stone has had upon
what is, in United Nations terms, fittingly described as the progressive development of International Law.
8. Stone, Of the Feasibility of Tasks in Problems Confronting Sociological Enquiries
Concerning International Law, 89 RECEUIL DES CouRs 65, 138 (1956).
9. See Freund, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 16 U. CHICAGO L. R. 205, 213 (1959).
10.... Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for discovering wise policy. A
court is confined within the bounds of a particular record and it cannot even shape
the record. Only fragments of a social problem are seen through the narrow windows
of a litigation. Had we innate or acquired understanding of a social prrJblem in its
entirety, we would not have at our disposal adequate means for constructive solution.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 365-6 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion).
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